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Abstract
We find strong evidence in the OECD country panel data to support the Knightian view that non-
diversifiable economic risks shape the equilibrium entrepreneurship in an occupational choice model.
Differential social insurance of entrepreneurial and labor risk is found to be statistically significant and
detrimental to entrepreneurship. The crowding-out effect of public production of private goods on
entrepreneurship dominates the crowding-in effect of public production of public goods. Evidence is
found for the proposition that the rate of entrepreneurship is positively related to the degree of income
inequality and negatively to the union power in the economy. The results suggest that a high living
standard also has a detrimental effect on entrepreneurial risk-taking.2
1 Introduction
In any economy, however organized its economic institutions, it is enterprises and the
entrepreneurs, whether self-employed only or those also employing hired labor, whether privately or
collectively owned, which create most of the economic value-added. Although the organizational
structures of firms vary greatly among countries at different stages of development, it is
entrepreneurship which is the jobs, growth  and welfare creation engine.
Empirical data (OECD Labor Force Statistics) point to the striking finding that the rate
of entrepreneurship (entrepreneurs and those working on their own account relative to the total labor
force) varies greatly between different economies. In 1990, Norway (5.4%), Austria (5.6 %) and
Denmark (5.9 %) were examples of countries with a below average rate of entrepreneurship. Belgium
(11.4 %), Ireland (10.2 %), the UK (10.6 %) and Australia (11.9 %) were examples of countries with
a much higher rate. Between those cases fell most central European countries, while the
Mediterranean countries typically have even higher rates of entrepreneurship resulting from their rather
high rate of self-employment. It is possible that one may point out issues related to construction of
comparable data in various countries. Our presumption in the current study, however, is that the
regularities detected in the measured rate of entrepreneurship are largely real and not explained by
how the data are created.
1
Economic theory has largely left unexplained why such a cross-country variation in the
rate of entrepreneurship arises and persists among industrial economies and how it is related to
economic structures and national economic policies. This is rather striking not least because of the bald
fact that it is entrepreneurship which is the key driving force in economic development. Understanding
the incentive mechanisms in formation of enterprises is by far the most necessary input in building up
an understanding of why economic performance, efficiency and job creation-ability are so diverse
among industrialized countries. Such a research task seems rather urgent, not least in the light of the
high and persistent unemployment, especially in Europe, which is linked to the symptom more
generally known as Eurosclerosis. Are there just too few enterprises? Why don't the existing ones
grow so as to employ more people?
In considering the evolution of economic institutions and public policies over recent
decades, one cannot but notice the quite substantial expansion of public sectors in industrialized
economies. We may well ask whether such an expansion in general and the emergence of the Welfare
                                               
    
1 Moreover, some of the differences in data can be controlled by dummy variables in the
econometric analysis.3
State in particular is beneficial or detrimental to enterprise formation and hence for the future of the
Welfare States. The focus of the theory of the Welfare State has been on analysis of the production of
public goods and in evaluating the operation of tax systems. We will have a different focus: the
Welfare State as an insurance mechanism. Such a theory is much more limited. Sinn's recent influential
papers (Sinn (1995, 1996)) considered the allocative implications of redistributive taxation in the
context of risk-taking and moral hazard effects. He found that redistributive taxation can be efficiency
enhancing in that it creates a social insurance mechanism which stimulates risk-taking. Recently, Bird
(1998) found empirical support for such propositions. He used seven-country panel data to explore the
level of income risk, relating it to various country characteristics, including redistributive spending. He
found that the variance of log annual income correlates positively with indicators of redistribution
which he takes as an indication that the Welfare State can indeed induce risk-taking.
There is, however, little analysis of the impact of public policy and the social risk-sharing
institutions on entrepreneurship, the key test of risk-taking subject to limited diversification
opportunities. The only exception appears to be the work by Fölster and Trofimov (1997). They
introduced a life-cycle model of entrepreneurial choice where agents have a preference ordering over
the future society, having the choice between voting for an entrepreneurial society or a welfare state.
Such a choice was assumed to result in low or high taxation respectively. They find evidence in favor
of a multiple polito-economical equilibrium in cross-country data.
The current paper raises the question of the extent to which the differences in private
enterprise formation are related to economic risks and how the institutions of the Welfare State
interact with entrepreneurship. In Section 2, we survey some of the existing theoretical models of
determinants of entrepreneurship. We proceed to formulate a stylized model of the equilibrium rate of
entrepreneurship in an economy subject to risks and we introduce the Welfare State. Our approach
belongs to the family of models of risky occupational choice. It highlights the fundamental difference
between the labor and the entrepreneurial risks:  production of safety will never eliminate the genuine
entrepreneurial risk. Though for obvious reasons, neither private nor social institutions provide
insurance against entrepreneurial risks.
In section 3, we test the propositions arising from our model using cross-country panel
data among 20 OECD countries over four years, 1978, 1983, 1988 and 1993. Our findings should not
be taken as evidence against the Welfare State, rather as indicating that there is a trade-off between
differential social insurance and incentives. Such a message ought not to be a surprise. In the final
section, we discuss briefly some normative implications.
2 Theoretical Framework4
2.1 The Theory of the Entrepreneur: A Brief Taxonomy
Entrepreneurship, including self-employment, results from risky occupational choice by
individuals. The theory of entrepreneurship goes back at least to Knight (1921) who viewed
entrepreneurs as ultimately bearing the economic risk of failure.
2 After a long difression on this matter,
the economic profession reintroduced the role of entrepreneurial risk-bearing in the theory of the firm,
but not before the late 1970s. The economic underpinnings of this issue have been the subject of
analysis by a few pioneering papers including Lucas (1978), Kanbur (1979, 1981), Kihlstrom and
Laffont (1979), Fölster and Trofimov (1996), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) and Boadway et al.
(1998).
3 The determinants of entrepreneurship have also been extensively empirically studied since the
late 1980s. These studies have utilized both longitudinal, time-series and cross-section data.
4
Fundamentally, the key contribution of the theoretical literature over the past two
decades has been in its ability to endogenize the determination of the rate of entrepreneurship in an
occupational choice framework. The ingenious paper by Lucas (1978) was the first to introduce ability
differences to explain enterprise size distribution and growth in his work on Gibrat's law. The
theoretical literature has ever since suggested that individuals differ in their ability to produce
economically valuable ideas or in their ability to organize production successfully. In Kihlstrom and
Laffont (1979), less risk-averse agents will become entrepreneurs; moreover, the lower the rate of risk
aversion is, the bigger the size of the firm will be in their model. In Kanbur (1979) entrepreneurs are
self-selected prior to knowledge of their entrepreneurial ability. In Boadway et al. (1998), differences
in ability (to sell the product) give rise to different success probabilities. While Lucas (1978),
                                               
    
2 The view of entrepreneurs as primary risk-takers is deeply rooted in the Knightian tradition. Such
risks show up in the unpredictability of entrepreneurial earnings, risky capital income, and in the
bankrutpcy rates. The data reported by Eurostat (see Enterprises in Europe, Fourth Report (1995))
suggests that the failure rate of new firms in the European Union is substantial in the early years of an
enterprise. After the first year, 20 % of new firms close down and 35 % have disappeared within the
first three years. After five years, only 50 % remain in the market. The well-known Schumpeterian
view (cf. Schumpeter (1942)) highlights entrepreneurs as innovators, the heros of economic progress.
Our framework below is consistent with both these classical views though it will test only the
relevance of the former explicitly.
    
3 The literature up to the early 1990s has been reviewed by de Wit (1993).
    
4 For a representative sample, see Blau (1987), Evans and Leighton (1989), Evans and Jovanovic
(1989), Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994a, 1994b), Van Praag and Van Ophem (1995), Lindh
and Ohlsson (1996). For a survey, see Lindh and Ohlsson (1997).5
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and Kanbur (1979) abstracted from financial issues,
5 Boadway et al.
(1998) introduced capital and thereby the financial issues arising from informational asymmetries.
Indeed, it is a frequently  reported empirical regularity in the econometric literature on
entrepreneurship that finance and liquidity interfere with formation of new enterprises.
6 Boadway et al.
(1998) focused on the effects of liquidity constraints on the entry of new firms with no equity under
private information about the success probability (adverse selection). They also considered
endogenous effort by the employees while the earlier models of entrepreneurship abstracted from such
issues. In all models, risk-sharing between the entrepreneurs and the labor force is rather limited,
though the equilibrium wage rate is not fully immune to market risks. Unfortunately, the analysis of the
Welfare State and the social risk-sharing institutions on entrepreneurship is overly limited.
7 
2.2 A "Stylized" Model of Occupational Choice in the Welfare State
While the existing literature has correctly emphasized the fundamental difference
between the entrepreneurial risk and labor risk, it has not produced a theory of their role in the Welfare
State. Therefore, and in the light of lack of sharp, testable predictions on the relationship between
public policy and enterprise formation, it is an appealing research agenda to formulate a rather
"stylized model" for the purposes of organizing the discussion and laying the foundations for
econometric analysis with aggregate country data. Such an analysis can best be viewed as
complementary to, and not a substitute for the previous empirical work.
Our stylized model is closely related to the earlier models on entrepreneurship as
resulting from risky occupational choice, extending and qualifying these models in several directions.
When introducing such a framework, one should notice that there indeed are a number of mechanisms
which interact with the market entry of new enterprises (not to mention their optimal size or the size
distribution which we will not discuss). In the spirit of the Knightian view, we want to introduce the
                                               
    
5 Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) assume that agents are endowed with a strictly positive stock of
wealth with no default risk. In Kanbur (1979), revelation of the entrepreneurial ability before
production will take place is reflected in the optimal scale and employment of the firm but again in the
absence of default risk.
    
6 See Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Black, De Meza and Jeffreys (1993), De Wit (1993a), Holtz-
Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994a,1994b), Blanchflower and Oswald (1997), Lindh and Ohlsson
(1996). Industry-level panel data has been successfully used by Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999), who
found statistically significant financial effects on entry of new enterprises.
    
7 Kanbur (1979,1981) introduced progressive taxes arriving at an ambiguity result: such a tax may
or may not increase enterprise formation, depending on the nature of risk aversion.6
risk of default. From such a perspective and unlike the models reviewed above, our model highlights
the key aspect that market entry typically requires some costly ex ante commitment.
8 This can be
viewed as the ex ante cost of developing the idea, carrying out the necessary investment in human
capital, or allocating private assets into productive use. Ex post, such a cost is sunk and cannot be
recouped in the case of default. The personal cost of default is most concrete in the case of outside
finance. Equity markets typically abstain from financing new firms with no reputation or history
because of the lemon risk. Creditors face the very same informational problem under limited collateral.
To avoid the lemon problem, contracts with full liability may be signed, resulting in inefficient risk-
sharing. Such contracts impose a substantial risk on those entrepreneurs who resort to debt financing.
9
The saved or inherited wealth of a potential entrepreneur is then subject to default while non-
entrepreneurial agents will typically not face such a risk.
10 Neither private nor social institutions
provide - apparently for good reason - insurance against such risks.
11 Instead, and viewing the
occupational choice of a potential entrepreneur as an option with an entry premium, the social
insurance for labor may actually raise the entrepreneurial threshold by raising the reservation income.
12
This follows from the fact that it becomes more costly to give up the alternative income which is safe.
The implication is that private and collective risk-sharing tend to become substitutes instead of being
complements.
13 Sinn (1995,1996) has recently drawn attention to the government's superior ability to
insure risks in the form of redistributive taxation. However, Sinn assumes that both the entrepreneurial
                                               
    
8 One can think that such a cost implicitly enters Kanbur (1979) where the occupational choice
cannot be reversed after observing the ability.
    
9 Survey data on Finnish firms (Borg and Borg (1997)) shows that for 32 per cent of all
entrepreneurs (for 21 per cent of their families) 100 per cent of personal wealth was tied up as
collateral in 1994. The corresponding figure in 1996 was only slightly lower, i.e. 29 and 19 per cent.
For more than half of all entrepreneurs, 25-100 per cent of total personal wealth was tied up as
collateral both in 1994 and in 1996.
    
10 In contrast, the privilege of limited liability protects the shareholders of the companies quoted on
the stock exchange. Though such risk-sharing between the claimants (creditors) cannot be a free
lunch, the point is that such risk insurance is typically not available for entrepreneurs either through
private or public insurance.
    
11 The default risk has currently been analyzed in the context of real options by Alvarez and
Kanniainen (1998) who have generalized the idea of the Pratt-Arrow risk premium to the context of
non-trivial risks including default.
    
12 Note that the reverse implication arises from the pioneering paper by Domar and Musgrave
(1944), the first study suggesting that taxation of risky income when associated with full loss offsets
(i.e. social insurance) leads to increased investment in risky assets relative to safe assets.
    
13 For an earlier proposal along these lines, cf. Kanniainen (1993).7
risk and the labor risk are equally insured by society. Once this assumption is relaxed, the implications
of the Welfare State need to be reconsidered.
In building a positive theory of the entrepreneur, we note that if the market demand in a
particular industry is elastic, the entry of a new enterprise tends to crowd out rents of the intramarginal
enterprises. Such a crowding-out effect will, however, also arise in more competitive circumstances as
a result of bidding for labor, a mechanism to be built in our stylized model below. With a given
entrepreneurial input or ability combined with labor input, the feasible technology tends ultimately to
exhibit diminishing returns on the variable input. The outcome of this mechanism is to restrict the
optimal size of an enterprise, which then will have an indirect impact on the number of enterprises in
equilibrium. Moreover, given that the fixed population of agents will in all equilibria be allocated
between labor input and entrepreneurs, the marginal entrepreneur tends to face increasing cost of
variable inputs, thereby creating a barrier to other potential entrepreneurs both by raising the value of
the outside option and the cost of production. Finally, the theory of entrepreneurship has not provided
us with an understanding of the overall effects of the public sector. We will establish these effects in
our model in terms of public and private goods produced by the public sector.
There are thus several reasons why we want enough structure in our model. We want to
analyze (i) the role of risks (ii) the role of the public sector (iii) the effects of the nature of markets in
general (say, demand elasticity). We will introduce a general equilibrium model of risky occupational
choice with the condition that the market for entrepreneurs will clear. To formalize, we consider a
pool of potential entrepreneurs in a population of individuals with the population size normalized to
unity, N = 1, all having an option for a simultaneous market entry to a non-existent industry at the first
stage. We assume for a moment that all agents are born as "lucky lottery winners" in that they face no
financial constraints. The entrepreneurs have access to technology
(1)                q = ef(x,p) = ex
Æp
￿             0 < Æ,￿  < 1,
where x = labor input and e = {0,1} is the entrepreneurial effort, the necessary input. Variable p stands
for the public infrastructure. There are high (H) and low (L) ability types such that the low-ability types
face a higher fixed cost of production c
H < c
L. Ability differences are taken to be exogenous; they are,
for example, culturally inherited as a within-family human capital. The decision to enter at the first
stage is interpreted as an ex-ante commitment to irreversible fixed investment k > 0 under uncertainty
about the state of the future market. The lottery prize is assumed to be sufficient to cover such a
commitment. Investment k is an industry-specific constant. After commitment in stage 1, the state is
revealed to be ı = (g,b) with probabilities (º,1-º). The good state is characterized by g = 1, the bad by8
0 < b < g. The market demand is taken to be of constant elasticity form
(2)                    Pı = ıQı
-￿p
ª,           ￿  > 0, ª < 0.
The public sector thus affects entrepreneurship via various channels (we will exclude analysis of grants,
subsidies or profit taxes). First, the public sector produces public goods (infrastructure, education,
etc.) which make the firms' production more efficient. We have modelled this effect in (1), treating the
public production of public goods as an input in the production function of the private sector. Such a
complementarity of private and public inputs gives rise to a positive crowding-in effect. Second, the
public sector also produces private goods, which can crowd out private production by decreasing the
demand for private goods. Such an effect is modelled in the demand function (2). When ª < 0, public
production crowds out private sector demand at the rate ª/￿  because Q = ı
1/￿ P
-1/￿ p
ª/￿ . Third, labor is
needed for the production of public goods (see below). Finally, social risk insurance (also introduced
below) interacts with firm formation.
We denote n = n
H + n
L = the ex-ante entry, where the number of high-quality types n
H
is exogenous. While the high-quality types will always enter as entrepreneurs, the low types will
rationally optimize their entry in a forward-looking way, making total entry n endogenous. 1-n-m
stands for the share of population not acting as entrepreneurs, with m denoting the labor demand by
the public sector. Introducing the public sector production function as p = m
1/￿ , ￿  > 0, m = p
￿  is thus
the degree to which public production crowds out labor from the private sector. The state-dependent
production condition is given by
(3)                ￿ ı = Pıxı
Æp
￿ - wxiı - c
i $ 0       i = H,L.
In the good state, the number of producers is n = n
H + n
L. It is easy to see that all produce the same
amount (with labor demands xg
H = xg
L); the high-ability types earn greater rents than the low-ability
types. In the bad state, only the high-ability types produce. The low-ability types and their labor enter
the unemployment pool. It remains to solve for the equilibrium wage rate w, the state-dependent
outputs, Qg = nxg
Æp
￿, Qb = n
Hxb
Æp
￿, price Pı and the equilibrium ex-ante entry, n*.
As to the labor market, we assume that the wage rate will be determined ex ante before
the state is observed. Workers take competitive bids from firms without knowing the type of firms.
Hence, the wage rate will be the same across firms. After the state is revealed, the wage will not be
renegotiated and there is no inter-firm mobility of labor. From the ex-ante perspective, firms are
assumed to be risk-neutral expected profit maximizers who contract on the wage under uncertainty.9
Each of them takes the market price and labor cost as given. The employment decision will take place
after resolution of uncertainty and the state-dependent labor demands will therefore be given from (3)
as xı
H = (w/ÆPıp
ª)
1/(Æ-1), ı = g,b;  xg
L = (w/ÆPgp
ª)
1/(Æ-1), xb
L = 0. The employment per firm will thus be
given by
(4)      xg = (n
￿w/Æ)
æp
￿ ,  xb = ((n
H)
￿ w/Æb)
æp
￿ ;     æ = 1/(Æ(1-￿ )-1), ￿  = -(￿ (1-￿ )+ª)/(Æ(1-￿ )-1).
The parameter ￿  summarizes the impact of the public sector on private labor demand; it can take
either sign depending on the favorable productivity effect (￿ ) and the unfavorable crowding-out effect
(ª). Public labor demand raises the wage cost for private firms in that the labor market equilibrium
requires ex ante that
(5)           n
H[ºxg
H + (1-º)xb
H] + n
Lºxg
L = 1-n-m.
In the good state, there is no unemployment. Rewriting (5) as the relationship between the
endogenous wage and entrepreneurship
(5b)      n
Hº[n
￿w/Æ]
æp
￿  + n
H(1-º)[(n
H)
￿ (w/Æb)]
æp
￿  + (n-n
H)º[n
￿w/Æ]
æp
￿  = 1-n-m
allows us to solve for the market wage rate as a function of the market entry n and the public sector as
(6)              w*(n,p) = [(1-n-p
￿ )/ˆ(n)p
￿ ]
1/æ.
We have denoted ˆ(n) = ºn(n
￿ /Æ)
æ + (1-º)n
H((n
H)
￿ /Æb)
æ > 0. We show first
Lemma. If demand is elastic (inverse demand elasticity ￿ < 1) or of unitary elasticity, the
equilibrium wage will rise with the rate of entrepreneurship, M Mw*/M Mn > 0.
Proof. Evaluating Mw*/Mn, one can see that sgn(Mw*/Mn) = sgn[(-1/æ)(ˆ(n)+ˆ'(n)(1-n-p
￿ )]. With 
elastic demand, ￿  < 1, ˆ'(n) > 0, æ < 0; hence Mw*/Mn > 0. With unitary demand elasticity, ￿  = 1, ˆ'(n)
= 0, æ = -1; hence Mw*/Mn > 0.
14                                                        QED
                                               
    
14 With inelastic demand, ￿  > 1, ˆ'(n) < 0, æ < 0 and the result is at least in principle ambiguous.10
In order to solve for the equilibrium entry, n*, we introduce the non-insurable risk of
defaulting k, a form of failure of the risk markets, and we introduce the differential social risk insurance
in terms of differential unemployment compensation for non-producing entrepreneurs (￿ e) and for
labor (￿ ). Such a differential social insurance will be parametrized as ￿ e < ￿ . We now write the
occupational choice for potential L-type entrepreneurs as indifference between expected profit over
the two stages and the outside option as
(7)             E[￿ L] = º￿ g
L + (1-º)￿ e - k = ºw* + (1-º)￿ .
We do not model risk aversion explicitly. We note, however, that by choosing not to become an
entrepreneur, an employee avoids the non-insurable risk of losing k. One should also pause a moment
to pay attention to the double role played by the market wage w* both as the opportunity cost and the
production cost for the entrepreneur. Market entry can be viewed as representing a test of the
economic value of an entrepreneurial idea. The ex-ante equilibrium number of entrepreneurs under the
risk of default
15 has to be consistent with the required equilibrium profit, say ˜e(n,p),
(8)              ￿ g
L $ ˜e(n,p) = º
-1[ºw* + (1-º)(￿ -￿ e) + k].
Making use of the condition that the amount of labor per firm in the good state has to satisfy xg = (1-n-
m)/n, one can rewrite (3), the expression for profit, as
(9)        ￿ g
L(n,p) = ((1-n-m)/n)(1-n-m)
1/æ[n
-(￿ +1/æ)p
￿ (1-￿ )+ª - (ˆ(n)p
￿ )
-1/æ] - c
L.
In equilibrium, F(n,p) / ￿ g
L(n,p) - ˜e(n,p) = 0. With a general demand function, (9) is rather involved.
In the case of unitary elasticity (with ￿  = 1, æ = -1, ￿  = ª), it simplifies radically to
(9b)      ￿ g
L(n,p) = (1/n)[1-ˆ(n)]p
ª - c
L
where 0 < ˆ(n) < 1 when ￿  = 1. We confine our analytic proposition to this case. Based on (9b),
M￿ g
L(n,p) /Mn < 0. Consulting (8), we can state some key comparative static results concerning the
entry: Mn*/Mº > 0, Mn*/M(￿ -￿ e) < 0, Mn*/Mk < 0 to be summarized as
                                               
    
15 Such a risk is not included in the Kanbur (1979) or Kihlstrom-Laffont (1979) models.11
Proposition. Under unitary demand elasticity, the equilibrium rate of entrepreneurship is
positively related to the success probability of the firm but negatively to the differential social
insurance faced by labor and entrepreneurs and to the required ex-ante commitment.
Like the previous theoretical work, our stylized model suggests that entrepreneurial
risks reduce the equilibrium rate of entrepreneurship.
16 We will have a chance in the econometric
analysis below to test the hypotheses of the impact of aggregate risks and social insurance, while no
measures are available for potential differences in the cost of commitment.
It is of substantial interest to ask how the public sector output interacts with the
enterprise formation. We used our model to solve for the effect of public sector production on
entrepreneurship Mn*/Mp = -Fp/Fn. The details of such an analysis are available in a separate technical
appendix. It turned out in the case of unitary elasticity (and even with fully segmented labor markets,
p
￿  thus ignored), that the effect is ambiguous. We will thus leave it for the econometric analysis to
determine whether it is the crowding-in or crowding-out effect which dominates.
  For the econometric analysis, we will extend our framework, but only informally, in two
further directions. We notice that there are a variety of different labor market institutions in various
countries. The departure of the labor market from the competitive setting potentially interacts with the
incentives for enterprise formation. The degree of exogeneity of the outside option (wage rate) is
affected in particular by the labor unions having an impact on the equilibrium entry of entrepreneurs. A
test of such an effect will be introduced in the econometric part.
Finally, recall that so far we have formally analyzed a model of "lucky lottery winners"
facing no financial constraints. Such constraints arise most naturally when there are informational
asymmetries. As a consequence, they may operate like barriers to entry in the presence of differences
in the quality of potential entrepreneurs. Financial institutions do have monitoring technologies which
help to screen between various risky projects. Such technologies, however, provide imperfect signals
about the quality of the projects  and the financial institutions will be subject to two types of decision
error (some high-ability project-holders will not be financed while some with lower ability will). Given
that access to finance
17 may interact with enterprise formation, it is appropriate to test its impact
                                               
    
16 Empirical support for such a proposition has been previously obtained by Parker (1996) in the
UK time-series data.
    
17 Over any given time period, market entry tends be reduced under financial constraints. Such an
effect reduces demand for labor but increases its supply. Entering firms will be more profitable and
their bargaining power relative to labor enhanced. The equilibrium wage tends to be reduced. The
effects of financial constraints are, however, complicated and subject to some controversial issues. In
Boadway et al. financial constraints lead to credit contracts which boost the number of enterprises.12
empirically. Many studies report significant financial effects (Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Black, de
Meza and Jeffreys (1996), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen
(1994a, 1994b), Lindh and Ohlsson (1996), de Wit (1993a)). The results have been derived from time-
series regressions or from indirect asset effects or the income distribution effect. Estimates obtained by
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), for example, imply that the probability of self-employment depends
positively upon whether the individual ever received an inheritance or gift.
We will only briefly elaborate the role of financial effects on entry. Equity markets do
not finance projects in the absence of the reputation or personal history of an entrepreneur. However,
credit markets may provide finance with collateral or based on ex-ante screening. It is crucial to ask
how the project risk will be shared between the project-holders and the creditor. This determines
whether and to what extent the market for new entrepreneurs can be a market for lemons. Indeed, the
documented entry rate is substantial (cf. Geroski (1995) for the stylized facts) but the failure rate is
also high. Implicitly therefore, such evidence speaks against the common interpretation that finance
restricts new entry and also indicates that some entrants are lemons. Under restricted liability, the
opportunist incentive to test new ideas is substantial; entry represents a call option for a project-holder
and there may be too much entry as Boadway et al. (1998) suggest. They were the first to point to the
possibility of excess entry under debt contracts. They implicitly use the assumption of limited liability,
but abstract from the sunk cost of entry, hence underestimating the true entrepreneurial risk.
Moreover, under full liability, the incentive is the reverse. It is plausible that effectively the liability is
often partially limited, but not fully eliminated. Ultimate risk-sharing, however, may remain uncertain
ex ante due to contract incompleteness. In the light of the complexity of the issue, it is advisable to let
the data speak for itself.
3. Testing the Implications of the Model: The Econometric Analysis
3.1 Model Specification
We will carry out the econometric analysis using cross-country panel data on 20 OECD
countries (see below) for 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, i.e. in five-year intervals. The econometric model
on entrepreneurship to be estimated can be cast as
                                                                                                                                                      
One of the implications of outside financing under informational asymmetry is that the quality of
entrepreneurs may become more heterogenous. If the liability is limited, it is not the case that only
firms with positive net present value projects have an incentive to enter.13
(10)         nit = ￿ o + ￿j￿jzijt + ￿j,h ￿jhzijtziht + ￿d ￿dDd + ￿it
where ni stands for the rate of entrepreneurship in the country i, i=1,...,20; t = 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993.
This variable represents the empirical counterpart of our theoretical n-variable. To allow for structural
differences between countries in the panel, fixed country effects could be added. However, one of the
explanatory variables (replacement ratio, see below) is time-invariant, though subject to inter-country
differences, i.e. zikt = zik and would be perfectly multicollinear with country dummy variables. Also,
some other variables have much more variation across countries than over time. Therefore, we prefer
not to introduce fixed country effects. However, we include some country group dummy variables and
year dummies, Dd. The cross-products zijtziht measure the interaction effects to be used to test the
effects of social insurance. In our estimation procedure, the risk, the public sector and the union
density variables introduced as the explanatory variables will be lagged by 3 years relative to the
variable to be explained, to eliminate the problem of reversed causality. Variable ￿ it stands for the error
term with E[￿ it] = 0, E[￿ it]
2 = ￿
2, E[￿ it￿it-￿ ] = E[￿ it￿jt] = 0. The following country-specific variables
enter the econometric analysis:
ni = rate of entrepreneurship is measured as the ratio of people working on their own account relative
to the total labor force.
zi1 = national economic risks (s) are measured by the conditional standard deviation of log GDP
around the trend. For each country, we estimated a linear trend equation for log GDP with
GARCH(1,1) error process over the period 1970-1992, and divided the square root of the conditional
variance by the average GDP. (The risk variable will be lagged by three years). We thus work with the
assumption that local (within-country) risks are perfectly correlated but there is no cross-country
correlation in risks.
18 While Parker (1996) used the number of strikes to proxy the risk faced by
entrepreneurs, measuring the turbulence of industrial relations, we note that our risk measure is
analogous to that in Bird (1998).
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18 Though such a specification could be generalized to allow for sectoral or internationally
correlated risk, it is the most natural first step. One can also legitimize the analysis using a measure of
national risks in that the export markets amount to at most a quarter or a third of total demand in the
typical OECD countries.
    
19 One can perhaps raise the counterargument that our risk variable may not be truly exogenous if a
high rate of entrepeneurship means a large share of non-labor income in the functional income
distribution. It is not clear, however, whether such an effect is important.14
zi2 = public sector and welfare state variables (r, p, f, t) are measured alternatively by the following
variables: the replacement ratio i.e. unemployment compensation relative to labor income on average
(r), the share of total public sector expenditure (public investment, public consumption and transfers)
in the total GDP (p), transfer payments as a percentage of GDP (f), and the total tax rate (taxes as a
percentage of GDP) (t). We thus use the r-variable as a proxy for differential social insurance for
entrepreneurial risks and labor risks. We also use some interaction variables to test whether the social
risk insurance affects the overall risk effect.
zi3 = financial variable (d), measured by domestic credit expansion, and alternatively by the nominal
lending rate.
zi4 = inequality of income distribution will be measured by the Gini coefficient calculated from
household (pre-tax) income data. It has been suggested in some studies (Jenkins (1995), Lindh and
Ohlsson (1996)) that in the light of the redistributive effects of public policy, the required asset
accumulation facilitating enterprise formation may be too limited. Such effects will be tested in the
current paper.
zi5 = union membership ratio (u), is used to measure the effect of union power on enterprise formation
through labor market mechanisms. In countries with strong labor unions, the opportunity cost effect
can be expected to be higher than on average.
xi6 = stage of development of the economy will be measured by the real GDP per capita. We note that
Acs, Audretsch and Evans (1994) have previously found a negative relationship between
entrepreneurship and economic development.
z1z2 = interaction effect between risk-taking and the public sector is tested by introducing the product
terms ps, ts, fs. If the favorable social insurance effect dominates, the coefficient is expected to be
positive, hence reducing the risk effect, which is negative.
                                                                                                                                                      
Another point is related to the role of fiscal policy as an automatic stabilizer in an economy. If it
manages to reduce the overall income volatility, it may have one more channel between the public
sector and enterprise formation. Our model, however, is an equilibrium model and we do not
endogenize the determination of income risks.15
z7 = Mediterranean dummy to account for differences between the industrial structures of the
Mediterranean countries and the other countries in the data set.
z8 = US dummy to account for the exclusion of owner-managers from the definition of an
entrepreneur.
z9 = Finland-Sweden dummy to account for a change in the construction of statistics in 1988 and 1993
relative to the earlier years.
z10-z12 = year dummy variables.
3.2 Estimation Results
Diagnostic checks of the model
In testing the predictions of the theory, we have organized the data as a panel, country-
by-country. We introduce the following diagnostics to check the model specification:
(i) We use White's (1980) heteroscedasticity test of residuals and we report the corrected t-statistics
from the heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. (ii) To test the normality of the error term,
we use the Jarque-Bera test. (iii) We also introduce Ramsey's RESET test in order to test the
adequacy of the model specification, including omitted variables, incorrect functional form, and
correlation between the regressors and the residuals.
Results
We introduce the following step-wise testing procedure. In the first stage, we test the
risk effect, essentially the Knightian view, allowing at the same time for structural differences between
countries. We then proceed to test the effects of the public sector on entrepreneurship in a number of
ways. Here we distinguish between the social insurance effect and the crowding-in/crowding-out
effects. With these results to hand, in the second stage we test the financial, income inequality, union,
and development stage effects.
The results are reported in tables 1-2. It turns out that the explanatory power of the
model is relatively high even allowing for the risk effect and the structural effects only. There appears
to be some heteroscedasticity in some models. We therefore report the White's adjusted t-values
throughout. It turns out that the Finland-Sweden dummy is not significant and it will be dropped from
other estimations; the Mediterranean and US dummies, however, are both significant and will be
included. The Jarque-Bera tests do not typically alarm over deviations from the normality of residuals.16
The RESET test accepts the specification, the p-value in the F-test being only 0.380 in the first
equation. However, as an additional test, we also estimated our model using cross-sectional data on
country averages in our sample. These "between" estimates were quite similar to those reported
below.
(i) Risk effect. 
The coefficient estimate of the risk variable appears to be negative and statistically
significant in all our regression equations. Such a finding supports the basic theory of the negative
impact of aggregate risks on entrepreneurship. Thus, given the public sector variables, an increase in
aggregate risk reduces the equilibrium entrepreneurship.
(ii) Public sector: social risk insurance.
In equations (II) and (III), we report our tests for the effects of social insurance. Our
variable for the differential social insurance (r) obtains a regression coefficient which is negative and
statistically significant with a t-value of -4.277. Such a finding strongly supports the proposition of our
model that given the risk level, an increase in social risk insurance in the Welfare State reduces
entrepreneurship. We also find that the variable for transfer payments (f) also obtains a negative
regression coefficient with a significant t-value of -3.00. These are direct effects, but the overall effects,
including the indirect ones are also negative.
We then tested the indirect impact of social risk insurance on entrepreneurship through
its impact on the risk effect by including the interaction variables. The interaction between the risk
effect and social unemployment insurance measured by the product variable r*s (not reported in our
tables), obtained a coefficient with a non-significant t-value of 0.332. The test is not informative about
Sinn's proposition. The finding, however, is consistent with the implication of our model.
We then introduced interaction between the aggregate public sector variables and risk
effect in terms of the interaction variables f*s, p*s and t*s, reported in test equations III-V. Such a test
is obviously not ideal in that the fiscal policy variables also reflect the infrastructure and crowding-out
effects. It turned out that the coefficients of these interaction terms are positive which indicates that an
expansionary public sector indeed reduces the risk effect. This is a somewhat impure measure of the
social insurance effect. The overall effects turn out to be systematically negative, thus speaking against
the Sinn's proposition. The overall effects can be found as follows. The total impact of transfer
payments on entrepreneurship (on average) can be obtained from dn/df = -0.295 + 0.747*0.393 = -17
0.001 where 0.393 = the mean of the risk variable. Similarly, the overall effects of the public sector
expenditure can be calculated from equation IV as -0.043 and that of taxes from equation V as -0.072.
The fact that some studies (including Parker (1996)) have reported positive and
significant effects from unemployment on self-employment suggests that the unemployment
compensation, though generous, does not fully eliminate the desire to change civil status. We did not
test for such an effect. However, our study appears to be the first one to use the replacement ratio in
testing the effects of social insurance.
(iii) Public sector: crowding-in, crowding-out.
Next, we look into the direct public sector effects (equations (IV) and (V)). Without
interaction effects, the public sector variables p and t obtain negative and significant coefficients with t-
values -2.378 and t = -2.138. Taken together, these results suggest that it is the crowding-out effect
which dominates the crowding-in effect in the OECD data from the 1970s to the 1990s.
(iv) Financial effects.
The coefficient of the domestic credit expansion variable is statistically insignificant
(equation (VI)). Such a weak result is somewhat at variance with the earlier findings which have
identified stronger impacts. It is, however, consistent with the ambiguity view concerning whether
financial factors limit entry or attract lemons. However, this result may also have to do with our
financial variable. It was not possible to create a measure for credit expansion, say over several years,
because of changed procedures in construction of financial statistics available to us. Credit expansion
had to be measured over one year only while the dependent variable is a stock rather than a flow of
entry to entrepreneurship. We also carried out testing experiments with the market interest rate but this
turned out not to be significant, either. Our results are thus somewhat at variance with those of Parker
who found significant negative effects for the (real) interest rate variable but no role for personal net
wealth.
(v) Income inequality.
A measure of income inequality (the Gini coefficient) was used to provide another and
independent test of the financial effect. In equation (VII), its coefficient had the predicted positive sign
with a rather high t-value of 1.964. Because the Gini variable was negatively correlated with the r-18
variable, we ran this test without the latter one.
(vi) Union effect.
We next introduced the union density to measure the exogenous union effect on the
wage rate and thereby on entrepreneurship. We again had to exclude the r-variable due to
multicollinearity, obtaining a negative coefficient estimate with a t-value of -1.787.
(vii) Stage of development.
The stage of development measured by the real GDP per capita had a significant
coefficient with a t-value of -2.734. Its negativity invites the interpretation that a high living standard
may have a detrimental effect on entrepreneurship.
4. Conclusions
There are a number of insightful results reported by our study which suggests that
economic risks shape the allocation of human capital between entrepreneurs and labor supply. Among
its many dimensions, the main focus of the current paper has been the interaction between private
enterprise formation, entrepreneurship and the public sector. We introduced a rather stylized model
which, however, is rich enough to organize the discussion and form the theoretical foundation for
aggregate econometric analysis. Such an analysis was carried out by resorting to international panel
data on a set of OECD countries. Several complementary tests were introduced. In the light of those
findings, the Knightian view of entrepreneurs as risk-takers re-emerges as an empirically valid
paradigm. The Welfare State does not provide insurance to share the failure risk of entrepreneurs.
Tests of the effects of differential social risk insurance based on the replacement ratio in unemployment
compensation for labor and on the effects of transfer payments point to the conclusion that the Welfare
State creates detrimental incentive effects on risk-taking in the form of entrepreneurship. Moreover, it
is the case that the crowding-out effects of public production of private goods on entrepreneurship
dominate the crowding-in effects of public production of public goods. Public goods are
complementary to private inputs but large public sectors tend to limit the expansion of the sector
consisting of private enterprises. Unlike many earlier studies, the findings do not provide strong
support for the view that financial constraints limit the equilibrium entrepreneurship. Instead, support is
found for the proposition that the rate of entrepreneurship is positively related to the degree of income19
inequality and negatively to the union density in the economy. The results also indicate that a high
living standard may have a detrimental effect on entrepreneurship.
The efficiency of market allocation of occupational choice is of substantial interest. Do
market forces guarantee that the right number of people and those with the right skills choose to enter
as entrepreneurs? Is the equilibrium efficient? Are there dynamic externalities from entrepreneurship,
for example, in the form of providing learning-by-doing? Do the costs of information create welfare
losses in terms of unoptimal entry? Is it possible to improve the operation of the risk markets in their
task of evaluating untested ideas? It is also important to raise a number of other normative issues, like
the optimal size and industry distribution of enterprises and their efficient growth rate. Moreover, one
might inquire whether the economic policies have created mechanisms which have primarily supported
operations of existing large incumbent firms. Before addressing these issues, it is clear that the research
target has to be more focused initially. It is hoped that our paper serves that purpose.
Appendix. Data Sources
The data we use has been constructed as reported below and includes the following
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the USA.
After preliminary estimation, Iceland was dropped from the data set because the values of many of its
variables clearly represented outliers.
* The rate of entrepreneurship is measured by the ratio of people working on their own account
(excluding farmers), source: Labour Force Statistics, OECD 1997. There are some classification
differences. For example, the US data do not include owner-managers among entrepreneurs. Such
differences will be taken care of by national dummies. Moreover, definitional changes in data (cf.
Sweden and Finland) will be taken care of by a year dummy for these countries. The panel consists of
1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, i.e. five year intervals for of 20 OECD countries. In many European
countries some services like health care are produced by the public sector instead of the private one.
For this reason, there will be some differences in the rate of entrepreneurship in the data.
* National economic risk will be measured by the relative trend deviations of the real GDP over the
period 1970-1992 (the ratio of the conditional standard deviation in a regression of the logarithmic
GDP with the time trend and GARCH(1,1) error, relative to the average of the log GDP). Data
source: Penn World Tables.20
* Public sector effect and variables of collective risk-sharing will be measured alternatively by the
following variables: the share of total public expenditure (including transfer payments) in the total
GDP, income transfers as percentage of GDP, and the total tax rate (taxes as a percentage of GDP).
Data Source: Mäki (1995).
* The replacement ratio is obtained from Layard, Nickel and Jackman (1991). Its value at the
beginning of the 1990s is used for each country; it is not possible to obtain reliable comparable data
from all years.
* The stage of economic development will be measured by the real GDP per capita in constant dollars
adjusted for changes in the terms of trade (1985 international prices for domestic absorption, current
prices for exports and imports). Data source: Penn World Tables.
* Credit expansion will be measured by the growth rate of bank credit over the preceding year relative
to the observation of the rate of entrepreneurship (i.e. 1977-1978, 1982-1983, 1987-1988, 1992-
1993). The data are drawn from the IMF Financial Statistics Yearbook 1997.
* Interest rate will be measured by the lending rate for the years 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993; it is derived
from IMF Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1992, 1997.
* The inequality of income distribution will be measured by the Gini coefficient calculated from
household (pre-tax) income data. Source: Deininger and Squire Data Set, The World Bank.
* Union density. Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 1991, 1997.
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